Chechnya, EU-Serbia and a Disputed Lands Update
I was informed of Branko Milanovic's April 17 comments in Politika (a daily Serb newspaper) about Serbia and the European Union (EU). At last notice, Milanovic has the title of Lead Economist for the World Bank's research group unit, dealing with poverty and inequality issues. In Politika, he states why Serbia should not rely so much on the idea of EU membership. Milanovic notes that the EU position on Kosovo is in conflict with much of Serbia (the EU refuses to formally recognize Kosovo as a part of Serbia). In his view, it is better for Serbia to work on improving its standing from within and perhaps not have EU membership. Short of Serbia being in the EU, Milanovic does not rule out positive EU-Serb relations and adds that the EU will not (as per his proposal) initially appreciate being shunned. At the same time, the EU appears a bit overextended. As has been previously noted in some of my other commentary: - The two newest EU members (Bulgaria and Romania) do not yet have full EU membership rights. - There are other nations ahead of Serbia waiting for EU membership. - These other nations might have to wait awhile before becoming EU members.
On April 16, the United Nations (UN) rebuked Serbia for planning an election process in Kosovo. The UN commentary states that Serbia should respect UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Has the UN issued any formal criticism against those countries recognizing Kosovo's independence? What is the greater contradiction of the mentioned UN Security Council Resolution?
Kosovo is a main issue of difference in the current relationship between Russia and leading Western countries. It is diplomatically foolhardy for Russia to unnecessarily cruise for a bruise with these nations. Some believe that it is Russia which should ditch the Serb stance to break the impasse. This view overlooks a few key points. Moscow and Belgrade are not alone in opposing Kosovo's independence, for the well founded reasons that have been presented. The American "realist school" of foreign policy thinking is noticeably represented by the belief that support for Kosovo's independence is not in America's national interests.
Of late, there has been increased diplomatic activity to resolve the former Moldavian SSR dispute between Moldova and Pridnestrovie (Trans-Dniester). A number of analysts seem to be of the reasonable impression that the Kremlin is trying to forge a reunited Russian leaning former Moldavian SSR, that would permit Tiraspol to have considerable autonomy. Such an agreed to scenario could serve as an example for settling the dispute over Kosovo. With good reasoning, Pridnestrovie continues to believe that is has a better case for independence than Kosovo.
In some circles, concern has been expressed about the Russian government announcing its intent to expand its ties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This diplomatic move by Moscow falls short in recognizing the two disputed regions as independent entities from Georgia. Using baseball terminology, the Russian announcement can be likened to throwing a brush back pitch in response to Georgia seeking NATO membership and the support given to Kosovo's independence.

