A Closer Look at Improving Russia's Image
Michael Averko
July 21, 2008
Richard Lourie's July 7 Moscow Times article "It'll Take More Than PR to Improve Russia's Image" focuses attention on how Russia at large can better improve upon the coverage of itself. His presentation does not include taking issue with the media coverage of Russia.
Lourie recommends the release of jailed tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky as a positive image booster for Russia. The more encompassing advocacy encourages improvement in Russia's legal and prison structures. Such a stance shows a greater humanitarian concern, which could also benefit Khodorkovsky; who to a good extent is responsible for his convicted/interned status.
Lourie goes on to say that Russia could promote its great Soviet contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany, as a means of fostering a better image. Over the course of time, there has been considerable historiography from Russian academia and media in support of this point. Among Western World War II historians, there seems to be a general consensus acknowledging the tremendous Soviet effort. Promoting it too much is likely to bring up other topics. This includes the 1939 Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact, which came after the West's selling out Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany in 1938. Another subject concerns the number of central and east Europeans, who have a negative feeling about the aftereffects of the Soviet Union's World War II victory. Some of these central and East Europeans had a checkered wartime legacy, which was followed by the Cold War period of willing homegrown dupes, who oppressed their fellow nationals.
This series of thoughts lead to the belief that Russia's image is best served by putting the differences out in the open and having them directly replied to with informatively interesting exchanges which do not duck the differences. Russia at large can not be faulted for much of the negative coverage against it. The Russian government funded 24/7 television news station Russia Today can improve the situation by having informative and lively point-counterpoint exchanges between opposing advocates.
Yevgeny Kiselyov's July 2 Moscow Times commentary "Lessons About Franco, Football and Freedom" suggests that present day Russia has similar aspects to Psain and the USSR of 1964. A few noticeable differences are not mentioned in his piece.
In Madrid, the Soviet soccer team which lost to Spain at the 1964 European championship final did not have many of its citizens at the game. This was due to the era of Soviet travel restrictions. After its loss to Spain, the Soviet team faced some rebuke upon its return to the USSR.
In contrast, the 2008 European soccer championship tournament saw many Russians freely leave Russia to watch their team. None of them appear to have sought political asylum. Following its semi-final loss to Spain, the Russian team was well received in Russia, where there has not been any significant bad mouthing of it.
The recent success of several Russian sports teams have enhanced Russian national pride. Some people seem to prefer that Russia only be portrayed negatively. Regarding Russia's 2008 soccer experience, a different comparison than Kiselyov's references American enthusiasm for its upstart ice hockey team that won the gold medal at the 1980 Winter Olympics. The Russian soccer team at the 2008 European championship tournament was the youngest and performed much better than what was expected.
Besides the American ice hockey victory in 1980, one can find other instances of increased American patriotism in the 1980s. The United States was coming off a bad experience in Indochina, the hostage taking of its citizens in Iran and the impression that its Cold War Soviet rival made geo-strategic gains in the 1970s. The feeling of getting thumped on nurtured a counter-response. After facing a difficult previous decade, post-Soviet Russia is undergoing the same kind of process.
Georgy Bovt has a series of questionable suggestions on how Russia can better improve its relationship with Ukraine. His views are stated in his July 9 Russia Profile article "The Ukrainian Dead End." This piece is a continuation of Bovt's Russia is wrong on Ukraine mindset that was expressed in his two other Russia Profile articles "Improvised Policy" (May 28) and "Conflicting Values" (May 21).
His Russia Profile commentary refers to those in the Ukrainian government who want to limit Russian language use while pressing for the Holodomor to be recognized as a genocide against Ukrainians. Bovt does not provide the basis of opposition to these stances. It is not only many Russians finding fault with these preferences. There are several nations that have more than one official language. With this in mind, the level of Russian language use in Ukraine makes a dual language policy plausible. The 1930s famine in the Soviet Union was especially hard on Ukraine; an unquestionable suffering due to failed planning, which was not intended to eliminate Ukrainian identity.
Bovt's May 21 piece sees nothing wrong with Ukraine's government pushing for NATO membership against the will of the majority of Ukraine's population. He comes across as expecting Russia and the majority of Ukraine's population to let that happen without protest. What happened to the democratic idea of people power challenging an unpopular move? Is there a legitimately great need to have Ukraine in NATO?
Bovt's May 21 article attributes Soviet ways on Russia as if Ukraine is free of such. Symbolically, Russia's non-Soviet flag and emblem have not been changed, with no noticeable movement to do so. On ridding of the Soviet past, Bovt does not protest Ukraine's Soviet drawn boundaries. Likewise, he seems at ease with efforts by some Ukrainian Orange activists to downplay and/or slur pre-Soviet Russian historical figures like Alexander Suvorov, Catherine the Great and Alexander Pushkin. This as they advocate the portrayal of World War II era Galician Ukrainian leader Stepan Bandera as a great historical figure. These positions are opposed by many in Ukraine. For the most part, Bandera's popularity is limited to western Ukraine (primarily the Galician region).
In his May 28 article, Bovt questions why after the Soviet breakup, elements within Russia began opposing the ceding of the Russocentric Crimean region from Russia to Ukraine in 1954. The obvious reason has to do with Crimea no longer being part of the same nation as Russia. The 1954 change of Crimea's status was in commemoration of the 300th anniversary of the Pereyaslavl Treaty, which formally unified Russia and Ukraine (Russia and Ukraine are historically descended from the Kievan Rus kingdom, that lasted from the the late 9th to about mid-13th century, before being overtaken by the Mongols).
Tacked onto Bovt's articles are Andreas Umland's Russia Profile contributions "Putin's New Man in Brussels" (Jan. 18) and "Post-Soviet Nationalism and the Future of Russia" (Jan. 15). During his time in Ukraine, Umland has accentuated Russian nationalism, while being mum on the anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalist variant. The latter is noticeable, though not reflecting most Ukrainians. Likewise, Russia is not the extremely negative nationalist place as caricatured in some circles. Umland's Jan. 18 critique of Russian NATO ambassador Dmitry Rogozin has a good deal of innuendo.
How well do some of the critics of Russia take criticism of their work? How often are they challenged and to what degree? Matters that partly relate to how Russia is perceived.
Lourie recommends the release of jailed tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky as a positive image booster for Russia. The more encompassing advocacy encourages improvement in Russia's legal and prison structures. Such a stance shows a greater humanitarian concern, which could also benefit Khodorkovsky; who to a good extent is responsible for his convicted/interned status.
Lourie goes on to say that Russia could promote its great Soviet contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany, as a means of fostering a better image. Over the course of time, there has been considerable historiography from Russian academia and media in support of this point. Among Western World War II historians, there seems to be a general consensus acknowledging the tremendous Soviet effort. Promoting it too much is likely to bring up other topics. This includes the 1939 Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact, which came after the West's selling out Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany in 1938. Another subject concerns the number of central and east Europeans, who have a negative feeling about the aftereffects of the Soviet Union's World War II victory. Some of these central and East Europeans had a checkered wartime legacy, which was followed by the Cold War period of willing homegrown dupes, who oppressed their fellow nationals.
This series of thoughts lead to the belief that Russia's image is best served by putting the differences out in the open and having them directly replied to with informatively interesting exchanges which do not duck the differences. Russia at large can not be faulted for much of the negative coverage against it. The Russian government funded 24/7 television news station Russia Today can improve the situation by having informative and lively point-counterpoint exchanges between opposing advocates.
Yevgeny Kiselyov's July 2 Moscow Times commentary "Lessons About Franco, Football and Freedom" suggests that present day Russia has similar aspects to Psain and the USSR of 1964. A few noticeable differences are not mentioned in his piece.
In Madrid, the Soviet soccer team which lost to Spain at the 1964 European championship final did not have many of its citizens at the game. This was due to the era of Soviet travel restrictions. After its loss to Spain, the Soviet team faced some rebuke upon its return to the USSR.
In contrast, the 2008 European soccer championship tournament saw many Russians freely leave Russia to watch their team. None of them appear to have sought political asylum. Following its semi-final loss to Spain, the Russian team was well received in Russia, where there has not been any significant bad mouthing of it.
The recent success of several Russian sports teams have enhanced Russian national pride. Some people seem to prefer that Russia only be portrayed negatively. Regarding Russia's 2008 soccer experience, a different comparison than Kiselyov's references American enthusiasm for its upstart ice hockey team that won the gold medal at the 1980 Winter Olympics. The Russian soccer team at the 2008 European championship tournament was the youngest and performed much better than what was expected.
Besides the American ice hockey victory in 1980, one can find other instances of increased American patriotism in the 1980s. The United States was coming off a bad experience in Indochina, the hostage taking of its citizens in Iran and the impression that its Cold War Soviet rival made geo-strategic gains in the 1970s. The feeling of getting thumped on nurtured a counter-response. After facing a difficult previous decade, post-Soviet Russia is undergoing the same kind of process.
Georgy Bovt has a series of questionable suggestions on how Russia can better improve its relationship with Ukraine. His views are stated in his July 9 Russia Profile article "The Ukrainian Dead End." This piece is a continuation of Bovt's Russia is wrong on Ukraine mindset that was expressed in his two other Russia Profile articles "Improvised Policy" (May 28) and "Conflicting Values" (May 21).
His Russia Profile commentary refers to those in the Ukrainian government who want to limit Russian language use while pressing for the Holodomor to be recognized as a genocide against Ukrainians. Bovt does not provide the basis of opposition to these stances. It is not only many Russians finding fault with these preferences. There are several nations that have more than one official language. With this in mind, the level of Russian language use in Ukraine makes a dual language policy plausible. The 1930s famine in the Soviet Union was especially hard on Ukraine; an unquestionable suffering due to failed planning, which was not intended to eliminate Ukrainian identity.
Bovt's May 21 piece sees nothing wrong with Ukraine's government pushing for NATO membership against the will of the majority of Ukraine's population. He comes across as expecting Russia and the majority of Ukraine's population to let that happen without protest. What happened to the democratic idea of people power challenging an unpopular move? Is there a legitimately great need to have Ukraine in NATO?
Bovt's May 21 article attributes Soviet ways on Russia as if Ukraine is free of such. Symbolically, Russia's non-Soviet flag and emblem have not been changed, with no noticeable movement to do so. On ridding of the Soviet past, Bovt does not protest Ukraine's Soviet drawn boundaries. Likewise, he seems at ease with efforts by some Ukrainian Orange activists to downplay and/or slur pre-Soviet Russian historical figures like Alexander Suvorov, Catherine the Great and Alexander Pushkin. This as they advocate the portrayal of World War II era Galician Ukrainian leader Stepan Bandera as a great historical figure. These positions are opposed by many in Ukraine. For the most part, Bandera's popularity is limited to western Ukraine (primarily the Galician region).
In his May 28 article, Bovt questions why after the Soviet breakup, elements within Russia began opposing the ceding of the Russocentric Crimean region from Russia to Ukraine in 1954. The obvious reason has to do with Crimea no longer being part of the same nation as Russia. The 1954 change of Crimea's status was in commemoration of the 300th anniversary of the Pereyaslavl Treaty, which formally unified Russia and Ukraine (Russia and Ukraine are historically descended from the Kievan Rus kingdom, that lasted from the the late 9th to about mid-13th century, before being overtaken by the Mongols).
Tacked onto Bovt's articles are Andreas Umland's Russia Profile contributions "Putin's New Man in Brussels" (Jan. 18) and "Post-Soviet Nationalism and the Future of Russia" (Jan. 15). During his time in Ukraine, Umland has accentuated Russian nationalism, while being mum on the anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalist variant. The latter is noticeable, though not reflecting most Ukrainians. Likewise, Russia is not the extremely negative nationalist place as caricatured in some circles. Umland's Jan. 18 critique of Russian NATO ambassador Dmitry Rogozin has a good deal of innuendo.
How well do some of the critics of Russia take criticism of their work? How often are they challenged and to what degree? Matters that partly relate to how Russia is perceived.
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