Iranian Mujahedeen, a force for democratic change in Iran
Jubin Afshar
March 26, 2006
The recent debate between Michael Rubin[1] and Iranian-Americans such as Jalal Arani[2] and Dr. Ali Safavi[3], as well as Clare Lopez[4] of the IPC, illustrate just how significant the Mujahedeen of Iran are in the Iranian puzzle and how urgently the US needs to get its policy house in order.
I agree with Clare Lopez that Rubin’s tirade against the MEK misses the mark on Iran on several points. Rubin’s indignant tone and his claim to the moral high ground by accusing his critics as “dishonest” unfortunately doesn’t help advance a constructive debate. Readers can best judge for themselves. And neither does his clinging to Ervand Abrahamian’s conclusions about the Iranian Mujahedeen. Abrahamian’s historical recounting of the Mujahedeen’s advocacy of democracy in Iran in the face of the clerical elements’ bullying tactics, is of course one of the many narrations of the early part of the post-revolutionary phase in Iran that should be taken seriously. But his deductions and inferences about the character and nature of the Mujahedeen as they transformed from a mass political movement to an exiled opposition force require critical review and not unchallenged acceptance, especially since Abrahamian's earlier observations belie his conclusions in latter chapters about the MEK. For one thing, the MEK "has not gone on into a world onto itself," as Abrahamian purports, but the group is rather at the center of the debate on Iran policy, 17 years after Abrahamian's work was published.
The formation of the Mujahedeen in the 1960s was a response to the failure of the reform politics of Mehdi Bazargan’s “Freedom Movement” and the “National Front,” as well as the Shah's elimination of all peaceful political activity. The early Mujahedeen were young and dedicated Muslim Iranians who sought an end to the Shah’s despotism and the formation of a free and democratic society in Iran. It was natural that as the United States supported the Shah, the Mujahedeen would oppose US interference in Iranian politics as did every other legitimate Iranian opposition. The discourse on the MEK or any other Iranian political group’s views about US policy in Iran in that era should be conducted in the context of the dominant intellectual influences of the era and the natural antipathy to perceived US backing for the Shah. As Dr. Safavi pointed out in his response to Rubin, the Bush Administration has presented a critical review[5] of the US foreign policy position that support for undemocratic leaders in the Middle East could achieve stability. Such a position only led to both lost credibility and instability. The correct policy should have been to support democracy as it remains today. The Mujahedeen’s opposition to US support of the Shah was not as Lopez correctly points out “because of any enmity towards Americans or ideological hostility to concepts of secular democracy,” but a natural reaction to then US support for the Shah’s corrupt dictatorship. Indeed, as cunning as Ayatollah Khomeini was, he leveraged anti-American sentiment within Iranian society to consolidate his regime and push the democratic opposition, including the Mujahedeen, to the fringes by branding them agents of "US imperialism." Regrettably, he was greatly assisted in this undertaking by the Communist Tudeh Party.
The Mujahedeen leader, Massoud Rajavi, imprisoned by the Shah in 1971 until January 1979, organized a vigorous and early ideological opposition to Khomeini’s Islamic fundamentalism and ran afoul of the clerical domination of the post-revolutionary power structures by insisting on democratic participation and precepts. When most left parties espoused an alliance with Khomeini in ousting the “liberals,” the Mujahedeen defended the right of democratic participation in the political process and held that the threat was from regressive Islamic fundamentalists led by Khomeini who eschewed democracy in favor of religious rule. And while Soviet sympathizers such as the Tudeh Party supported Khomeini and collaborated in the crackdown on democratic forces,[6] the Mujahedeen held that an attack against any one group or political force was an attack against all since it undermined democracy. [7]
The Mujahedeen are a well-organized, highly-educated, and devoted group of Iranian activists who have stood alone on the frontline to terror and Islamic fundamentalism for at least 27 years now – well before the West finally realized the threat. They have warned of, and urged vigilance against, “Islamic Fundamentalism: The New Global Threat”[8] for years, only to be brushed aside by skeptical intellectuals and Orientalists in Europe and the US,[9] as being too keen to drum up a negative image of the Islamic Republic of Iran or because of "having a horse in the race." They have tried to educate a cynical Western audience about the enormous capacity of the Islamic fundamentalists to inflict pain and suffering on the social fabric of modern society, ripping it asunder and thrusting it into a convulsion of crises that it can only benefit from. Yet, many in the West, have in the past, looked on with a sense of bewilderment and disbelief at how any human being can be as cruel and devastating as the Mujahedeen claim Iran’s ruling clique to be. Now, over four years after September 11, and other atrocities in Bali, Pakistan, Madrid, London, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is beginning to sink in that we are really faced with a global conflict between a very inhuman, sadistic, yet totally devoted ideology of hatred and extremism, that has invoked God and Islam, on the one hand, and the rest of the modern world with a colorful range of beliefs and ideas and yet with no steadfast defender to match the enemy’s resolve.
The Mujahedeen position deserved unreserved support from the start, but the US was far from its present understanding of the situation and its credibility was too damaged by its previous support of the Shah to be in a position to comprehend the threat.
The present exchange about the MEK has highlighted a much overlooked issue in the policy debate over Iran: What should a principled US policy position be towards the Iranian opposition now?
That question has in the past 27 years rested on what US policy was towards the regime in Iran. Iran policy has shifted from paralysis, to Iran-Contra, to containment, to dialogue, to perceived shared interests and issue-oriented cooperation, and finally a realization of lost time and clearly flawed strategic focus in letting the US Administration’s Iran policy to simply drift in the hope that the problem of an Iran ruled by Islamic fundamentalists will either go away or transform into a more benign one.
Tehran’s rulers have imposed a brutal theocracy that is in open conflict with democratic precepts. The Iranian regime is today a gross violator of basic human rights of its own citizens, and continuously and vigorously suppresses all serious opposition to its totalitarian rule over Iranian society. Coupled with its sponsorship of terrorism in the region, its illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons technology and its avowed goal to spread Islamic fundamentalism throughout the Muslim world and wipe whole nations off the face of the earth, the regime poses a grave threat to world peace and security. Iran’s geopolitical position, its vast oil and gas reserves, its young, educated and highly politicized and restive population, and its active resistance movement require a serious and urgent US policy in support of democratic change. The present Islamic fundamentalist regime has caused enormous pain and suffering on its own population, leading to a Diaspora of over 3 million Iranians throughout the world.
US policy toward the Iranian opposition has been a function of US policy toward the regime in general, shifting from ambivalence after the Shah’s downfall, to misguided hope in monarchist elements, and finally shunning opposition groups in hopes of forging ties with a perceived “reformist” president, and designation of the MEK as terrorist in the midst of the Clinton Administration’s opening to Iran,[10] and finally offering support today, at least in words, to Iranian dissidents, albeit, nameless and faceless dissidents.
The dilemma for the US remains that all legitimate Iranian opposition forces have roots in the anti-monarchic revolution of 1979. The only groups that supported US policy in Iran during the Shah’s rule were of course part of his rule. The US has to boldly recognize that its past involvement with the Shah was a vestige of the same policy that Secretary Rice eloquently criticized [11] recently. It should then lineup with the Iranian people’s aspiration for democratic change in Iran and recognize the MEK as a legitimate resistance movement.
In the absence of any independent political organizations, unions, or polls in Iran, the Iranian exile community represents, perhaps, a microcosm of Iranian society. And if the number of participants in rallies and meetings by Iranian opposition groups is any indication of popularity, the MEK has consistently shown that it is the largest and most popular and by far the most effective opposition force to the mullahs. Add to that the group’s revelations about the regime’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons which would not be possible without a significant support-network inside Iran.
Mr. Rubin’s charge that the MEK has no support in Iran is frankly baseless and by purporting to speak for Iranians, Rubin again misses the mark. Rubin speaks less for Iranians than Iranians themselves. The US should not decide the outcome of a political contest in Iran. Rather the US should support the isolation and de-legitimization of the rogue Iranian regime, and offer support for establishment of democracy through free, fair, and transparent elections under international auspice in Iran.
The Iranian umbrella group, National Council of Resistance of Iran, of which the MEK is a member, has publicly and consistently affirmed the principles of representative government, equal opportunity, equality of sexes, separation of religion and state, a free market economy, and a commitment to peace and tranquility in the region and the world. The NCRI seeks to form a transitional government to prepare for elections within six months of the present regime’s demise so that the Iranian people can choose their own constituent assembly to draft a free Iran’s constitution to be followed with democratic elections.
Enormous changes have transformed the Iranian political spectrum in the past three decades. In any formulation of a new policy on Iran the United States should not rely on the legacy that has haunted its approach to Iran in the past three decades. It is time for a new approach that is consistent with the current political circumstances and recognition of all legitimate opposition groups that strive for democracy in Iran.
Accordingly, the US needs to adopt a bold new policy on Iran and the Iranian opposition. Such a policy should consist of the following elements:
Recognizing the Iranian people’s right to resist tyrannical rule in Iran, and endorsing the holding of an internationally-monitored referendum on regime change so that the Iranian people would have the chance to express themselves freely. Otherwise, the Iranian people deserve support in formally resisting the regime to achieve their inalienable right to liberty and democracy.
Lending support to the Iranian opposition that aspires to the above principles of a free secular republic. The first step should be the removal of the terrorist designation of the MEK.
Jubin Afshar, a political scientist, is Director of the Middle East Project at Near East Policy Research in Washington, D.C.
1] Michael Rubin, “Monsters of the Left: The Mujahedin al-Khalq,” Frontpage Magazine, January 13, 2005 and Michael Rubin, “Hitting the Mark on Iran,” Frontpage Magazine, January 27, 2005.
2] Jalal Arani, “Are the Iranian Mujahedin ‘Monsters’?” Frontpage Magazine, January 25, 2005.
3] Ali Safavi, “Missing the Mark on Iran,” Frontpage Magazine, January 27, 2005.
4] Clare M. Lopez, “True Monsters of Iran: Terrorist Theocrats, Not the Mujahedeen-e Khalq,” Global Politician, January 31, 2006
5] President George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy,” White House, November 6, 2005: “Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe -- because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export.”
6] Noureddin Kianouri, Mardom, 1981 commentary. The Tudeh Party's Secretary-General wrote in a reference to Massoud Rajavi: "What have you done that unveiled women from uptown, the bourgeoisie and liberals are applauding you?"
7] Ervand Abrahamian, Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989), p.215
8] Mohammad Mohaddessin, Islamic Fundamentalism: The New Global Threat, (Washington, D.C., Seven Locks Press, June 1993)
9] William B. Quandt, “Review of Islamic Fundamentalism: The New Global Threat,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 1993
10] Michael Isikoff, “Ashcroft's Baghdad Connection,” Newsweek, September 26, 2002. When asked about MEK designation, here's what the Clinton administration's Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk told Newsweek on September 26, 2002: "... [There] was White House interest in opening up a dialogue with the Iranian government. At the time, President Khatami had recently been elected and was seen as a moderate. Top Administration officials saw cracking down on the [PMOI], which the Iranians had made clear they saw as a menace, as one way to do so.”
11] Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “Address to Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs,” US Department of State, September 30, 2005: “For 60 years, we often thought that we could achieve stability without liberty in the Middle East. And ultimately, we got neither. Now, we must recognize, as we do in every other region of the world, that liberty and democracy are the only guarantees of true stability and lasting security.”
I agree with Clare Lopez that Rubin’s tirade against the MEK misses the mark on Iran on several points. Rubin’s indignant tone and his claim to the moral high ground by accusing his critics as “dishonest” unfortunately doesn’t help advance a constructive debate. Readers can best judge for themselves. And neither does his clinging to Ervand Abrahamian’s conclusions about the Iranian Mujahedeen. Abrahamian’s historical recounting of the Mujahedeen’s advocacy of democracy in Iran in the face of the clerical elements’ bullying tactics, is of course one of the many narrations of the early part of the post-revolutionary phase in Iran that should be taken seriously. But his deductions and inferences about the character and nature of the Mujahedeen as they transformed from a mass political movement to an exiled opposition force require critical review and not unchallenged acceptance, especially since Abrahamian's earlier observations belie his conclusions in latter chapters about the MEK. For one thing, the MEK "has not gone on into a world onto itself," as Abrahamian purports, but the group is rather at the center of the debate on Iran policy, 17 years after Abrahamian's work was published.
The formation of the Mujahedeen in the 1960s was a response to the failure of the reform politics of Mehdi Bazargan’s “Freedom Movement” and the “National Front,” as well as the Shah's elimination of all peaceful political activity. The early Mujahedeen were young and dedicated Muslim Iranians who sought an end to the Shah’s despotism and the formation of a free and democratic society in Iran. It was natural that as the United States supported the Shah, the Mujahedeen would oppose US interference in Iranian politics as did every other legitimate Iranian opposition. The discourse on the MEK or any other Iranian political group’s views about US policy in Iran in that era should be conducted in the context of the dominant intellectual influences of the era and the natural antipathy to perceived US backing for the Shah. As Dr. Safavi pointed out in his response to Rubin, the Bush Administration has presented a critical review[5] of the US foreign policy position that support for undemocratic leaders in the Middle East could achieve stability. Such a position only led to both lost credibility and instability. The correct policy should have been to support democracy as it remains today. The Mujahedeen’s opposition to US support of the Shah was not as Lopez correctly points out “because of any enmity towards Americans or ideological hostility to concepts of secular democracy,” but a natural reaction to then US support for the Shah’s corrupt dictatorship. Indeed, as cunning as Ayatollah Khomeini was, he leveraged anti-American sentiment within Iranian society to consolidate his regime and push the democratic opposition, including the Mujahedeen, to the fringes by branding them agents of "US imperialism." Regrettably, he was greatly assisted in this undertaking by the Communist Tudeh Party.
The Mujahedeen leader, Massoud Rajavi, imprisoned by the Shah in 1971 until January 1979, organized a vigorous and early ideological opposition to Khomeini’s Islamic fundamentalism and ran afoul of the clerical domination of the post-revolutionary power structures by insisting on democratic participation and precepts. When most left parties espoused an alliance with Khomeini in ousting the “liberals,” the Mujahedeen defended the right of democratic participation in the political process and held that the threat was from regressive Islamic fundamentalists led by Khomeini who eschewed democracy in favor of religious rule. And while Soviet sympathizers such as the Tudeh Party supported Khomeini and collaborated in the crackdown on democratic forces,[6] the Mujahedeen held that an attack against any one group or political force was an attack against all since it undermined democracy. [7]
The Mujahedeen are a well-organized, highly-educated, and devoted group of Iranian activists who have stood alone on the frontline to terror and Islamic fundamentalism for at least 27 years now – well before the West finally realized the threat. They have warned of, and urged vigilance against, “Islamic Fundamentalism: The New Global Threat”[8] for years, only to be brushed aside by skeptical intellectuals and Orientalists in Europe and the US,[9] as being too keen to drum up a negative image of the Islamic Republic of Iran or because of "having a horse in the race." They have tried to educate a cynical Western audience about the enormous capacity of the Islamic fundamentalists to inflict pain and suffering on the social fabric of modern society, ripping it asunder and thrusting it into a convulsion of crises that it can only benefit from. Yet, many in the West, have in the past, looked on with a sense of bewilderment and disbelief at how any human being can be as cruel and devastating as the Mujahedeen claim Iran’s ruling clique to be. Now, over four years after September 11, and other atrocities in Bali, Pakistan, Madrid, London, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is beginning to sink in that we are really faced with a global conflict between a very inhuman, sadistic, yet totally devoted ideology of hatred and extremism, that has invoked God and Islam, on the one hand, and the rest of the modern world with a colorful range of beliefs and ideas and yet with no steadfast defender to match the enemy’s resolve.
The Mujahedeen position deserved unreserved support from the start, but the US was far from its present understanding of the situation and its credibility was too damaged by its previous support of the Shah to be in a position to comprehend the threat.
The present exchange about the MEK has highlighted a much overlooked issue in the policy debate over Iran: What should a principled US policy position be towards the Iranian opposition now?
That question has in the past 27 years rested on what US policy was towards the regime in Iran. Iran policy has shifted from paralysis, to Iran-Contra, to containment, to dialogue, to perceived shared interests and issue-oriented cooperation, and finally a realization of lost time and clearly flawed strategic focus in letting the US Administration’s Iran policy to simply drift in the hope that the problem of an Iran ruled by Islamic fundamentalists will either go away or transform into a more benign one.
Tehran’s rulers have imposed a brutal theocracy that is in open conflict with democratic precepts. The Iranian regime is today a gross violator of basic human rights of its own citizens, and continuously and vigorously suppresses all serious opposition to its totalitarian rule over Iranian society. Coupled with its sponsorship of terrorism in the region, its illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons technology and its avowed goal to spread Islamic fundamentalism throughout the Muslim world and wipe whole nations off the face of the earth, the regime poses a grave threat to world peace and security. Iran’s geopolitical position, its vast oil and gas reserves, its young, educated and highly politicized and restive population, and its active resistance movement require a serious and urgent US policy in support of democratic change. The present Islamic fundamentalist regime has caused enormous pain and suffering on its own population, leading to a Diaspora of over 3 million Iranians throughout the world.
US policy toward the Iranian opposition has been a function of US policy toward the regime in general, shifting from ambivalence after the Shah’s downfall, to misguided hope in monarchist elements, and finally shunning opposition groups in hopes of forging ties with a perceived “reformist” president, and designation of the MEK as terrorist in the midst of the Clinton Administration’s opening to Iran,[10] and finally offering support today, at least in words, to Iranian dissidents, albeit, nameless and faceless dissidents.
The dilemma for the US remains that all legitimate Iranian opposition forces have roots in the anti-monarchic revolution of 1979. The only groups that supported US policy in Iran during the Shah’s rule were of course part of his rule. The US has to boldly recognize that its past involvement with the Shah was a vestige of the same policy that Secretary Rice eloquently criticized [11] recently. It should then lineup with the Iranian people’s aspiration for democratic change in Iran and recognize the MEK as a legitimate resistance movement.
In the absence of any independent political organizations, unions, or polls in Iran, the Iranian exile community represents, perhaps, a microcosm of Iranian society. And if the number of participants in rallies and meetings by Iranian opposition groups is any indication of popularity, the MEK has consistently shown that it is the largest and most popular and by far the most effective opposition force to the mullahs. Add to that the group’s revelations about the regime’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons which would not be possible without a significant support-network inside Iran.
Mr. Rubin’s charge that the MEK has no support in Iran is frankly baseless and by purporting to speak for Iranians, Rubin again misses the mark. Rubin speaks less for Iranians than Iranians themselves. The US should not decide the outcome of a political contest in Iran. Rather the US should support the isolation and de-legitimization of the rogue Iranian regime, and offer support for establishment of democracy through free, fair, and transparent elections under international auspice in Iran.
The Iranian umbrella group, National Council of Resistance of Iran, of which the MEK is a member, has publicly and consistently affirmed the principles of representative government, equal opportunity, equality of sexes, separation of religion and state, a free market economy, and a commitment to peace and tranquility in the region and the world. The NCRI seeks to form a transitional government to prepare for elections within six months of the present regime’s demise so that the Iranian people can choose their own constituent assembly to draft a free Iran’s constitution to be followed with democratic elections.
Enormous changes have transformed the Iranian political spectrum in the past three decades. In any formulation of a new policy on Iran the United States should not rely on the legacy that has haunted its approach to Iran in the past three decades. It is time for a new approach that is consistent with the current political circumstances and recognition of all legitimate opposition groups that strive for democracy in Iran.
Accordingly, the US needs to adopt a bold new policy on Iran and the Iranian opposition. Such a policy should consist of the following elements:
Recognizing the Iranian people’s right to resist tyrannical rule in Iran, and endorsing the holding of an internationally-monitored referendum on regime change so that the Iranian people would have the chance to express themselves freely. Otherwise, the Iranian people deserve support in formally resisting the regime to achieve their inalienable right to liberty and democracy.
Lending support to the Iranian opposition that aspires to the above principles of a free secular republic. The first step should be the removal of the terrorist designation of the MEK.
Jubin Afshar, a political scientist, is Director of the Middle East Project at Near East Policy Research in Washington, D.C.
1] Michael Rubin, “Monsters of the Left: The Mujahedin al-Khalq,” Frontpage Magazine, January 13, 2005 and Michael Rubin, “Hitting the Mark on Iran,” Frontpage Magazine, January 27, 2005.
2] Jalal Arani, “Are the Iranian Mujahedin ‘Monsters’?” Frontpage Magazine, January 25, 2005.
3] Ali Safavi, “Missing the Mark on Iran,” Frontpage Magazine, January 27, 2005.
4] Clare M. Lopez, “True Monsters of Iran: Terrorist Theocrats, Not the Mujahedeen-e Khalq,” Global Politician, January 31, 2006
5] President George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy,” White House, November 6, 2005: “Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe -- because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export.”
6] Noureddin Kianouri, Mardom, 1981 commentary. The Tudeh Party's Secretary-General wrote in a reference to Massoud Rajavi: "What have you done that unveiled women from uptown, the bourgeoisie and liberals are applauding you?"
7] Ervand Abrahamian, Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989), p.215
8] Mohammad Mohaddessin, Islamic Fundamentalism: The New Global Threat, (Washington, D.C., Seven Locks Press, June 1993)
9] William B. Quandt, “Review of Islamic Fundamentalism: The New Global Threat,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 1993
10] Michael Isikoff, “Ashcroft's Baghdad Connection,” Newsweek, September 26, 2002. When asked about MEK designation, here's what the Clinton administration's Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk told Newsweek on September 26, 2002: "... [There] was White House interest in opening up a dialogue with the Iranian government. At the time, President Khatami had recently been elected and was seen as a moderate. Top Administration officials saw cracking down on the [PMOI], which the Iranians had made clear they saw as a menace, as one way to do so.”
11] Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “Address to Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs,” US Department of State, September 30, 2005: “For 60 years, we often thought that we could achieve stability without liberty in the Middle East. And ultimately, we got neither. Now, we must recognize, as we do in every other region of the world, that liberty and democracy are the only guarantees of true stability and lasting security.”
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