Ramifications of Russia's Diplomatic Move in the Caucasus
Michael Averko
September 03, 2008
The saying of "different strokes for different folks" comes to mind when observing the diplomatic stances taken to the recognition of disputed territories as nations.
On the matter of recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Serbia's non-recognition is in support of its claim to Kosovo. A Serb recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence might result in a Georgian response of recognizing Kosovo's independence (at last notice, the number of nations supporting Kosovo's independence is 45). The Kosovo Albanians reject recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia as nations. Russia is of the opinion that Abkhazia and South Ossetia have better independence claims than Kosovo.
Along with some other countries, Turkey rather ironically rejects the Russian, South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence position on the basis that it violates the territorial integrity of an existing nation. The mentioned irony has to do with other countries besides Turkey which recognize Kosovo's independence, in contradiction of Serbia's boundaries, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. Turkey's northern Cypriot supported government welcomes the Russian diplomatic move - adding that Russia should recognize northern Cyprus as a nation. After many years, Turkey remains the only country having that stance, which contradicts the authority of the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus.
The August 26 Russia Profile article "What's the Rush?," notes how several Kremlin connected Russian foreign policy elites suggest that more time should have been given on deciding whether to recognize South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence. Over the past weekend, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev accentuated his decision by saying that it is irrevocable.
The result of this enhances Georgian opposition to Russia and possibly increases a greater likelihood of Georgia and the West moving closer to each other. Prior to the Russian decision to recognize South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence, a number of observers seemed to feel that the idea of Georgia moving closer to Russia is a lost cause, while others thought differently.
Moscow had something to potentially gain and nothing to lose by holding off on whether to recognize South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence. The recognition of that independence decreases Russia's ability to utilize a "carrot and stick" approach with Georgia. Russia is a regional power in the Caucasus. In the hypothetical scenario of continued non-recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence, Moscow would not be more limited from doing what it wants to in the former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). Russian interests are best served by having the entire former Georgian SSR on good terms with the Kremlin - as opposed to Georgia being a staunch beachhead for Western neoliberal and neoconservative geopolitical advocacy.
Look at how the neoconservative/neoliberal advocates succeeded in supporting the anti-Milosevic coalition in then Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro). At the time, the involved Western groups did not comment about favoring Kosovo's independence. Had they done so, their support of the anti-Milosevic coalition would have been for naught. There is a Georgian consensus that South Ossetia and Abkhazia are a part of Georgia.
Had Russia not recognized South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence, the anti-Saakashvili/not so Russia unfriendly sentiment among Georgians would have a better chance at gaining strength. It can take awhile for a population to realize when their government has misled them. A point relating to the August 7 Georgian government strike into South Ossetia and Saakashvili's overly negative attitude towards Russia.
In the former Moldavian SSR conflict between Moldova and Pridnestrovie (the latter is often referred to as Trans-Dniester and several related spellings), Russia is trying to get the two sides reunited with the idea of having them close to Russia. The process includes taking into account Pridnestrovie's yearning to be as independent as possible.
Despite noticeable differences with the former Moldavian SSR conflict, Russia could have still attempted to pursue a settlement plan in the former Georgian SSR, which provides broad autonomy for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in affiliation with Georgia. Moldovans are not historically closer to the Russians than Georgians. Several factors lead Russia to the independence option with the disputed former Georgian SSR territories. Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin is not as desired a neoconservative/neoliberal leader as Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili (the two of them have definite shortcomings). Voronin appears more diplomatically adept than Saakashvili. For years, Moldova and Pridnestrovie have not had active combat with each other.
The Russian government is now faced with the situation of fewer nations recognizing their independence move in the Caucasus, when compared to the leading Western governments' promotion of Kosovo's independence. A matter that has a good deal to do with global clout than the merits of which disputed territory has the best independence claim.
Russia has gotten stronger. It still has a way to go. In the meantime, delicate diplomacy can serve to improve Russia's present and future standing.
On the matter of recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Serbia's non-recognition is in support of its claim to Kosovo. A Serb recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence might result in a Georgian response of recognizing Kosovo's independence (at last notice, the number of nations supporting Kosovo's independence is 45). The Kosovo Albanians reject recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia as nations. Russia is of the opinion that Abkhazia and South Ossetia have better independence claims than Kosovo.
Along with some other countries, Turkey rather ironically rejects the Russian, South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence position on the basis that it violates the territorial integrity of an existing nation. The mentioned irony has to do with other countries besides Turkey which recognize Kosovo's independence, in contradiction of Serbia's boundaries, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. Turkey's northern Cypriot supported government welcomes the Russian diplomatic move - adding that Russia should recognize northern Cyprus as a nation. After many years, Turkey remains the only country having that stance, which contradicts the authority of the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus.
The August 26 Russia Profile article "What's the Rush?," notes how several Kremlin connected Russian foreign policy elites suggest that more time should have been given on deciding whether to recognize South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence. Over the past weekend, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev accentuated his decision by saying that it is irrevocable.
The result of this enhances Georgian opposition to Russia and possibly increases a greater likelihood of Georgia and the West moving closer to each other. Prior to the Russian decision to recognize South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence, a number of observers seemed to feel that the idea of Georgia moving closer to Russia is a lost cause, while others thought differently.
Moscow had something to potentially gain and nothing to lose by holding off on whether to recognize South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence. The recognition of that independence decreases Russia's ability to utilize a "carrot and stick" approach with Georgia. Russia is a regional power in the Caucasus. In the hypothetical scenario of continued non-recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence, Moscow would not be more limited from doing what it wants to in the former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). Russian interests are best served by having the entire former Georgian SSR on good terms with the Kremlin - as opposed to Georgia being a staunch beachhead for Western neoliberal and neoconservative geopolitical advocacy.
Look at how the neoconservative/neoliberal advocates succeeded in supporting the anti-Milosevic coalition in then Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro). At the time, the involved Western groups did not comment about favoring Kosovo's independence. Had they done so, their support of the anti-Milosevic coalition would have been for naught. There is a Georgian consensus that South Ossetia and Abkhazia are a part of Georgia.
Had Russia not recognized South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence, the anti-Saakashvili/not so Russia unfriendly sentiment among Georgians would have a better chance at gaining strength. It can take awhile for a population to realize when their government has misled them. A point relating to the August 7 Georgian government strike into South Ossetia and Saakashvili's overly negative attitude towards Russia.
In the former Moldavian SSR conflict between Moldova and Pridnestrovie (the latter is often referred to as Trans-Dniester and several related spellings), Russia is trying to get the two sides reunited with the idea of having them close to Russia. The process includes taking into account Pridnestrovie's yearning to be as independent as possible.
Despite noticeable differences with the former Moldavian SSR conflict, Russia could have still attempted to pursue a settlement plan in the former Georgian SSR, which provides broad autonomy for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in affiliation with Georgia. Moldovans are not historically closer to the Russians than Georgians. Several factors lead Russia to the independence option with the disputed former Georgian SSR territories. Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin is not as desired a neoconservative/neoliberal leader as Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili (the two of them have definite shortcomings). Voronin appears more diplomatically adept than Saakashvili. For years, Moldova and Pridnestrovie have not had active combat with each other.
The Russian government is now faced with the situation of fewer nations recognizing their independence move in the Caucasus, when compared to the leading Western governments' promotion of Kosovo's independence. A matter that has a good deal to do with global clout than the merits of which disputed territory has the best independence claim.
Russia has gotten stronger. It still has a way to go. In the meantime, delicate diplomacy can serve to improve Russia's present and future standing.
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