Pakistan Again On The Cross Road
According to an editorial comment, it is widely held that a suicide bomber can´t be stopped from carrying out the carnage he has planned. While this argument is not without merit, it is not entirely true either. Yes, there is little the security agencies or hapless private guards can do once a fanatic with explosives on hand and mayhem on his mind reaches the venue of the crime. True, it is impossible to thoroughly check every truck or trailer entering or leaving major cities and, come to that, to know what sort of vehicle the terrorists will use at any given time. So here´s the point: we need better intelligence so that potential attackers can be checked in their tracks. Granted there may be slip-ups even with the strictest of vigilance but the threat of suicide attacks can at least be downgraded from the ever-present danger it is today to the occasional tragedy from which, sadly, no major country in the world is now immune.
This is precisely the theatre of war where Pakistan´s vast and lavishly funded network of intelligence agencies must engage the enemy within and deliver telling results sooner than later. What we have seen in recent years is an intelligence failure of catastrophic proportions. Cabinet members minced no words on Wednesday when they stated that the intelligence apparatus had "miserably failed" in pre-empting Saturday´s attack on the Marriott hotel in Islamabad as well as other acts of terrorism. The prime minister and his cabinet are right in asking the security agencies to get their act together. But why this should be so difficult is a troubling proposition. It is no secret that the intelligence agencies, and the ISI in particular, possess a unique insight into the workings of organisations that once came in handy in the misguided pursuit of ´strategic depth´ and have now turned on the state of Pakistan. True, the tactics of the militants have changed over the years, as has their leadership. Still, it should not be beyond the capabilities of the agencies to better infiltrate the insurgents with vastly improved results.
Perhaps, embroiled as they have been in politics over the years, the intelligence agencies have lost sight of the real problem. Now, without delay, they must refocus their energies. There is no want of expertise but the priorities are skewed — though understandably so given the direction in which the intelligence network has been pushed by a succession of politically vindictive rulers. More troubling is the lingering fear that decades of ideological indoctrination may have left their mark, that there may be ´renegade´ elements within the agencies that not only sympathise with the Taliban and their ilk but actively further their murderous cause. Even if this is untrue, a thorough rethink is in order. We are not fighting someone else´s battle.
The End

