Strategizing on Georgia and Ukraine
Michael Averko
October 15, 2008
Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili is not quite the puppet as some suggest. Choosing an across the board principle on disputed former Communist bloc territories (whether one agrees with it or not), he has not joined the American led effort to recognize Kosovo's independence. A move that takes into consideration Georgian claims on South Ossetia and Abkhazia. On this consistency point, note how the independence minded Kosovo Albanian leadership does not show support for the independence of other disputed former Communist bloc territories. Saakashvili's loose cannon manner suggests that it is not so off the wall to believe that his August 7 strike on South Ossetia could have been implemented without the prior knowledge and/or approval from Washington. The last point has been claimed by the Bush administration. Saakashvili probably sensed beforehand that the United States would not be so adamant in protesting his attack. On the surface, his military loss against Russia initially increased Western sympathy for him. There are signs that this mood is changing.
The question arises about Georgia's next president. As the Soviet Union was breaking up, American policymakers sought to nurture future leaders in that multinational entity. Saakashvili is a product of this recruiting. At the time, Russia was in not in a good position to have an effective parallel process. The Kremlin appeared to rely on the generally good historical relationship between Russia and Georgia. The latter has the right to seek a different direction. Also at issue is Georgia's geographical location and the limits of what Western support can achieve.
In comparison to Georgia, Ukraine is considerably larger, with a history and culture that is closer to Russia. There are nevertheless different historical and geopolitical perspectives among Ukrainian citizens. They involve preferences for either the West or Russia, as well as the desire to have close relations with both. These differences lead to the issue of how accurate they are depicted in proportional terms.
Ukrainian prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko's populist mindset best explains her recent views. Of late, she has drifted to a more Russia friendly stance, which includes refusing to criticize Russia's counterattack against Georgia. Tymoshenko's back and forth geopolitical swings between the West and Russia are nothing new in post-Soviet Ukrainian politics.
Ukraine's first post-Soviet president Leonid Kravchuk went from a career Communist Party functionary, to an anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalist (before the first post-Soviet Ukrainian presidential election in 1994), to a moderate voice during the so-called "Orange Revolution." In the 1994 election, Leonid Kuchma won the presidency over Kravchuk on a pro-Russian platform. Kuchma then shifted to policies away from Russia. Near the end of his second term of office, he showed signs of moving closer to Moscow.
Some Ukrainian opponents of Viktor Yanukovych's Party of Regions derisively call it the "Party of Russia." The Party of Regions is not without ambiguity. Until recently, it included the son of the late Ukrainian dissident and politician Vyacheslav Chornovil - who like his father is viewed as favoring positions that seek Ukraine being more distant from Russia.
Saakashvili's friend and like-minded Western neoliberal/neoconservative proponent, Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko, is well behind his two main political rivals (Tymoshenko and Yanukovych) in popularity. Yushchenko's 2004 presidential win involved somewhat mixed messages. His campaign highlighted an increase in Russo-Ukrainian business ties, when he served as prime minister under Kuchma. Yushchenko's campaign also succeeded in convincing many voters that he represented better government. Yushchenko now faces an uphill battle in trying to regain that image, which has noticeably dwindled since he became president. For political survival sake, one wonders what Yushchenko has in mind? In the long run, unpopular policies can only govern in an undemocratic setting.
Yushchenko recently had Tymoshenko investigated on any connection she might have had to his poisoning (of several years ago) and her possibly violating state security. This investigation seems politically motivated by Tymoshenko's recent differences with Yushchenko, who is pretty much getting a free pass; on account of his ties with influential Western politicos and Russian apprehension with Tymoshenko.
In addition to his unwavering support of Saakashvili, the unpopular (in Ukraine) Yushchenko:
>> expresses opposition to Russia's counterattack against the August 7 Georgian strike on South Ossetia
>> wants Ukraine in NATO (which most Ukrainian citizens oppose)
>> supports one Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) independent of the Moscow Patriarchate (the UOC affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate is the largest Orthodox denomination in Ukraine)
>> seeks removing Russia's Black Sea naval fleet from Crimea (the Russian navy's lease in that region expires in 2017)
>> opposes making Russian a dual language in Ukraine (at the very least, surveys show Russian language use in Ukraine to be on par with Ukrainian)
>> favors honoring the World War II era western Ukrainian based Ukrainian Insurgent Army (whose core supporters are arguably more anti-Russian than anti-Communist).
On these issues, the considerably more popular (in Ukraine) Tymoshenko and Yanukovych have positions which either differ from Yushchenko, or are toned down.
Regarding his recent meeting with Tymoshenko, Amercian vice president Dick Cheney might have said that he understood what she was doing (taking a "soft" view of Russia) and that this is fine with him - as long as she reverted back to a preferred neoconservative/neoliberal stance - upon assuming greater political strength. Shortly after that encounter and Yushchenko's investigation of Tymoshenko, she said that there should be no lease renewal for Russian naval use in Crimea after 2017. This was measured by Tymoshenko stating opposition to any foreign bases in Ukraine. She previously indicated that no definitive decision should be made on whether to extend Russian naval use in Crimea past 2017. Some Ukrainian officials might be playing hardball, as a way of seeking to get a better deal from Russia on a new lease.
In Ukraine, the ongoing pattern of expressing the will of the people to get votes, followed by the pursuit of other interests once in office has been played out. The efforts of Western neoconservatives and neoliberals to gain influence in Ukraine becomes adversarial when it is seen as an attempt to undercut Russia. From its vantage point, Russia should not appear overbearing, while maintaining ties with its supporters in Ukraine. The jockeying has begun for the next scheduled Ukrainian presidential election in 2010.
The question arises about Georgia's next president. As the Soviet Union was breaking up, American policymakers sought to nurture future leaders in that multinational entity. Saakashvili is a product of this recruiting. At the time, Russia was in not in a good position to have an effective parallel process. The Kremlin appeared to rely on the generally good historical relationship between Russia and Georgia. The latter has the right to seek a different direction. Also at issue is Georgia's geographical location and the limits of what Western support can achieve.
In comparison to Georgia, Ukraine is considerably larger, with a history and culture that is closer to Russia. There are nevertheless different historical and geopolitical perspectives among Ukrainian citizens. They involve preferences for either the West or Russia, as well as the desire to have close relations with both. These differences lead to the issue of how accurate they are depicted in proportional terms.
Ukrainian prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko's populist mindset best explains her recent views. Of late, she has drifted to a more Russia friendly stance, which includes refusing to criticize Russia's counterattack against Georgia. Tymoshenko's back and forth geopolitical swings between the West and Russia are nothing new in post-Soviet Ukrainian politics.
Ukraine's first post-Soviet president Leonid Kravchuk went from a career Communist Party functionary, to an anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalist (before the first post-Soviet Ukrainian presidential election in 1994), to a moderate voice during the so-called "Orange Revolution." In the 1994 election, Leonid Kuchma won the presidency over Kravchuk on a pro-Russian platform. Kuchma then shifted to policies away from Russia. Near the end of his second term of office, he showed signs of moving closer to Moscow.
Some Ukrainian opponents of Viktor Yanukovych's Party of Regions derisively call it the "Party of Russia." The Party of Regions is not without ambiguity. Until recently, it included the son of the late Ukrainian dissident and politician Vyacheslav Chornovil - who like his father is viewed as favoring positions that seek Ukraine being more distant from Russia.
Saakashvili's friend and like-minded Western neoliberal/neoconservative proponent, Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko, is well behind his two main political rivals (Tymoshenko and Yanukovych) in popularity. Yushchenko's 2004 presidential win involved somewhat mixed messages. His campaign highlighted an increase in Russo-Ukrainian business ties, when he served as prime minister under Kuchma. Yushchenko's campaign also succeeded in convincing many voters that he represented better government. Yushchenko now faces an uphill battle in trying to regain that image, which has noticeably dwindled since he became president. For political survival sake, one wonders what Yushchenko has in mind? In the long run, unpopular policies can only govern in an undemocratic setting.
Yushchenko recently had Tymoshenko investigated on any connection she might have had to his poisoning (of several years ago) and her possibly violating state security. This investigation seems politically motivated by Tymoshenko's recent differences with Yushchenko, who is pretty much getting a free pass; on account of his ties with influential Western politicos and Russian apprehension with Tymoshenko.
In addition to his unwavering support of Saakashvili, the unpopular (in Ukraine) Yushchenko:
>> expresses opposition to Russia's counterattack against the August 7 Georgian strike on South Ossetia
>> wants Ukraine in NATO (which most Ukrainian citizens oppose)
>> supports one Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) independent of the Moscow Patriarchate (the UOC affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate is the largest Orthodox denomination in Ukraine)
>> seeks removing Russia's Black Sea naval fleet from Crimea (the Russian navy's lease in that region expires in 2017)
>> opposes making Russian a dual language in Ukraine (at the very least, surveys show Russian language use in Ukraine to be on par with Ukrainian)
>> favors honoring the World War II era western Ukrainian based Ukrainian Insurgent Army (whose core supporters are arguably more anti-Russian than anti-Communist).
On these issues, the considerably more popular (in Ukraine) Tymoshenko and Yanukovych have positions which either differ from Yushchenko, or are toned down.
Regarding his recent meeting with Tymoshenko, Amercian vice president Dick Cheney might have said that he understood what she was doing (taking a "soft" view of Russia) and that this is fine with him - as long as she reverted back to a preferred neoconservative/neoliberal stance - upon assuming greater political strength. Shortly after that encounter and Yushchenko's investigation of Tymoshenko, she said that there should be no lease renewal for Russian naval use in Crimea after 2017. This was measured by Tymoshenko stating opposition to any foreign bases in Ukraine. She previously indicated that no definitive decision should be made on whether to extend Russian naval use in Crimea past 2017. Some Ukrainian officials might be playing hardball, as a way of seeking to get a better deal from Russia on a new lease.
In Ukraine, the ongoing pattern of expressing the will of the people to get votes, followed by the pursuit of other interests once in office has been played out. The efforts of Western neoconservatives and neoliberals to gain influence in Ukraine becomes adversarial when it is seen as an attempt to undercut Russia. From its vantage point, Russia should not appear overbearing, while maintaining ties with its supporters in Ukraine. The jockeying has begun for the next scheduled Ukrainian presidential election in 2010.
Print
Email
