Update on the Former Moldavian SSR Dispute
Michael Averko
January 03, 2009
Updated Jan. 4
The on again/off again former Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) settlement talks were restarted with last week's (Dec. 24) meeting in Tiraspol between the leaders of Moldova and Pridnestrovie (also referred to as Transnistria, Transdniestria, Transdnestr and Trans-Dniester). This meeting resulted in both sides agreeing to hold further talks on "confidence-building measures," as quoted from the Moldovan state news agency Moldpres.
Some commentary is of the view that this summer's war in the former Georgian SSR is quite relevant to the previous backtracking of negotiations between Moldova and Pridnestrovie. This opinion stresses the different positions taken by the former Moldavian SSR interlocutors on the mentioned conflict in the Caucasus. Putting aside diplomatic and other posturing, a key obstacle appears to be Pridnestrovie's government wanting a lesser relationship with Moldova - which is counter to the Moldovan government's preference. Relative to the Georgian government's August 7 strike on South Ossetia, Moldova has stated that it does not support military action to resolve the former Moldavian SSR dispute. Moldova's non-recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence is currently shared by every country with the exceptions Russia and Nicaragua. Since November 17, 2006, Pridnestrovie, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have recognized each other as independent states. Russia continues to not formally recognize Pridnestrovie's separation from Moldova. Shortly after its counterattack against Georgia, Russia repeated its support to see a negotiated former Moldavian SSR settlement that results in Pridnestrovie and Moldova as a national entity having regional autonomy.
Among pro-Pridnestrovie independence advocates, there is disenchantment with the international non-recognition their cause gets when compared to the independence consideration given to Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In comparison, Pridnestrovie has an arguably better historical case for independence than the other disputed former Communist bloc territories (pardon the omission of Nagorno-Karabakh in this article). Prior to the Soviet taking of Moldova in 1940, Pridnestrovie was an autonomous region within the Ukrainian SSR. Pridnestrovie was arbitrarily put into the Soviet created Moldavian SSR. In pre-Soviet times, it was part of the Russian Empire, as well as the Rus state, which lasted from roughly the late 9th to mid-13th centuries.
This and other points concern different ways of determining nationhood. One school of thought takes into consideration the historical basis, along with how the territory in question adheres to human rights (with disputed territories, this evaluation can consider the status of interethnic relations) and other matters like the ability to effectively govern. Regarding these issues, Pridnestrovie compares favorably to the situations in Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Another factor in determining independence gives consideration to prolonged violence as a reason for granting statehood. The supporters of independence for Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia take this position (putting aside the seemingly inconsistent application vis-à-vis how some nations choose to not recognize all three as independent, while recognizing one or two of them as such). This viewpoint seeks to end or limit violence by formally separating the parties in conflict (this perspective can be opposed with the notion that it essentially rewards armed conflict as a means for achieving nationhood). In contrast to Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia - Pridnestrovie has not had active warlike conditions for the past 16 years.
The upcoming parliamentary vote in Moldova could result in a government which is more in sync with Western geopolitical preferences. A noticeably more Western leaning Moldovan state serves to discourage Russia from advocating a reunited former Moldavian SSR. Russia's influencing of Pridnestrovie to accept a reunified settlement with Moldova might not be as great as suggested in some circles. If so, the reason might be due to Moscow being aware that Moldova could move closer to NATO in the future. Russia prefers a whole former Moldavian SSR closer to Moscow, as opposed to either all or a part of it in NATO.
Russia's non-recognition of Pridnestrovie's independence is partly done as leverage to discourage Moldova from becoming too close to NATO. If Moldova takes a decidedly pro-Western tilt, Russia might be more inclined to formally recognize Pridnestrovie's separation from Moldova.
The struggling global economy and Moldova's standing as Europe's poorest country, does not make it particularly attractive to either the European Union or Pridnestrovie. On the other hand, Pridnestrovie is facing difficulties as well. Between the West and Russia, the latter continues to have greater influence over the former Moldavian SSR. The Kremlin readily interacts with the authorities in Chisinau and Tiraspol. By and large, Western countries have been reluctant to deal with Pridnestrovie's government.
Note the ongoing back and forth Russia-West flirtations of Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin. The Russia-West "Great Game" in the former Moldavian SSR could eventually become passe. In the long run, Russia and the West might move closer towards each other.
Some recently related source material:
>> Moldpres (http://www.moldpres.md) "Moldovan President Met Transnistrian Administration Leader in Tiraspol," Dec. 24
>> Wikipedia (http://www.wikipedia.org) "International Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia"
>> Stratfor (http://www.stratfor.com) "Moldova: Transdniestria Grows Bolder," Aug. 12
>> The Diplomat - Bucharest (http://www.thediplomat.ro) "Russia Ready to Push for 'Solution' in Transnistria," Sept.
>> Eurasian Home (http://www.eurasianhome.org) "Settlement of the Transnistrian Conflict Came to a Deadlock," Dec. 2
>> RIA Novosti (http://enrian.ru) "Moldova's Rebel Region Appeals for Russian Financial Aid," Dec. 19
>> Angus Reid Global Monitor (http://www.angus-reid.com) "Communist Party Ahead in Moldova," Dec. 27
The on again/off again former Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) settlement talks were restarted with last week's (Dec. 24) meeting in Tiraspol between the leaders of Moldova and Pridnestrovie (also referred to as Transnistria, Transdniestria, Transdnestr and Trans-Dniester). This meeting resulted in both sides agreeing to hold further talks on "confidence-building measures," as quoted from the Moldovan state news agency Moldpres.
Some commentary is of the view that this summer's war in the former Georgian SSR is quite relevant to the previous backtracking of negotiations between Moldova and Pridnestrovie. This opinion stresses the different positions taken by the former Moldavian SSR interlocutors on the mentioned conflict in the Caucasus. Putting aside diplomatic and other posturing, a key obstacle appears to be Pridnestrovie's government wanting a lesser relationship with Moldova - which is counter to the Moldovan government's preference. Relative to the Georgian government's August 7 strike on South Ossetia, Moldova has stated that it does not support military action to resolve the former Moldavian SSR dispute. Moldova's non-recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence is currently shared by every country with the exceptions Russia and Nicaragua. Since November 17, 2006, Pridnestrovie, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have recognized each other as independent states. Russia continues to not formally recognize Pridnestrovie's separation from Moldova. Shortly after its counterattack against Georgia, Russia repeated its support to see a negotiated former Moldavian SSR settlement that results in Pridnestrovie and Moldova as a national entity having regional autonomy.
Among pro-Pridnestrovie independence advocates, there is disenchantment with the international non-recognition their cause gets when compared to the independence consideration given to Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In comparison, Pridnestrovie has an arguably better historical case for independence than the other disputed former Communist bloc territories (pardon the omission of Nagorno-Karabakh in this article). Prior to the Soviet taking of Moldova in 1940, Pridnestrovie was an autonomous region within the Ukrainian SSR. Pridnestrovie was arbitrarily put into the Soviet created Moldavian SSR. In pre-Soviet times, it was part of the Russian Empire, as well as the Rus state, which lasted from roughly the late 9th to mid-13th centuries.
This and other points concern different ways of determining nationhood. One school of thought takes into consideration the historical basis, along with how the territory in question adheres to human rights (with disputed territories, this evaluation can consider the status of interethnic relations) and other matters like the ability to effectively govern. Regarding these issues, Pridnestrovie compares favorably to the situations in Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Another factor in determining independence gives consideration to prolonged violence as a reason for granting statehood. The supporters of independence for Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia take this position (putting aside the seemingly inconsistent application vis-à-vis how some nations choose to not recognize all three as independent, while recognizing one or two of them as such). This viewpoint seeks to end or limit violence by formally separating the parties in conflict (this perspective can be opposed with the notion that it essentially rewards armed conflict as a means for achieving nationhood). In contrast to Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia - Pridnestrovie has not had active warlike conditions for the past 16 years.
The upcoming parliamentary vote in Moldova could result in a government which is more in sync with Western geopolitical preferences. A noticeably more Western leaning Moldovan state serves to discourage Russia from advocating a reunited former Moldavian SSR. Russia's influencing of Pridnestrovie to accept a reunified settlement with Moldova might not be as great as suggested in some circles. If so, the reason might be due to Moscow being aware that Moldova could move closer to NATO in the future. Russia prefers a whole former Moldavian SSR closer to Moscow, as opposed to either all or a part of it in NATO.
Russia's non-recognition of Pridnestrovie's independence is partly done as leverage to discourage Moldova from becoming too close to NATO. If Moldova takes a decidedly pro-Western tilt, Russia might be more inclined to formally recognize Pridnestrovie's separation from Moldova.
The struggling global economy and Moldova's standing as Europe's poorest country, does not make it particularly attractive to either the European Union or Pridnestrovie. On the other hand, Pridnestrovie is facing difficulties as well. Between the West and Russia, the latter continues to have greater influence over the former Moldavian SSR. The Kremlin readily interacts with the authorities in Chisinau and Tiraspol. By and large, Western countries have been reluctant to deal with Pridnestrovie's government.
Note the ongoing back and forth Russia-West flirtations of Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin. The Russia-West "Great Game" in the former Moldavian SSR could eventually become passe. In the long run, Russia and the West might move closer towards each other.
Some recently related source material:
>> Moldpres (http://www.moldpres.md) "Moldovan President Met Transnistrian Administration Leader in Tiraspol," Dec. 24
>> Wikipedia (http://www.wikipedia.org) "International Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia"
>> Stratfor (http://www.stratfor.com) "Moldova: Transdniestria Grows Bolder," Aug. 12
>> The Diplomat - Bucharest (http://www.thediplomat.ro) "Russia Ready to Push for 'Solution' in Transnistria," Sept.
>> Eurasian Home (http://www.eurasianhome.org) "Settlement of the Transnistrian Conflict Came to a Deadlock," Dec. 2
>> RIA Novosti (http://enrian.ru) "Moldova's Rebel Region Appeals for Russian Financial Aid," Dec. 19
>> Angus Reid Global Monitor (http://www.angus-reid.com) "Communist Party Ahead in Moldova," Dec. 27
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