California Murder Defense & The Admissibility of Spontaneous Statements: People v. Gutierrez
Paul Wallin
March 05, 2009
Three-year old sonīs out-of-court statement implicating father in motherīs murder is deemed inadmissible as spontaneous statement
People v. Gutierrez Los Angeles County:
On October 1, 1996, Dawn Nakatani, defendantīs ex-girlfriend and the mother of his child, was beaten, strangled, and left dead in her Baldwin Park home. More than two months after the murder in California, on December 7, 1996, the victimīs sister, Kim Pinto was driving defendantīs son to his maternal grandmotherīs house and mentioned that the next day they were going to visit his motherīs grave at the cemetery. The boy responded that he would "untie my mommy," that he saw his "daddy and his mean friend tie up my mommy," and that he hit his dad to get him to stop, at which point defendant carried him upstairs and placed a Casper video in the video cassette recorder for him to watch.
In People v. Gutierrez, the trial court granted the Peopleīs motion to introduce, over defendantīs objections, the out-of-court statement of defendantīs son implicating defendant in Nakataniīs death. At trial, Pinto testified that while she and defendantīs three-year-old son were driving to her motherīs house on December 7, 1996, approximately two months following the death of Nakatani, Pinto told the child that they were going to the cemetery to visit his motherīs grave. In response, defendantīs son told Pinto, "Iīm going to untie my mommy." Pinto asked the boy "who told him that," and he replied that "his daddy and his mean friend tied up his mommy." The child made a tying motion with his hands and pointed at his neck while making this statement. The boy stated that he hit defendant, told defendant to stop, and defendant carried him upstairs. While making his statement, the child was crying, and "scrunching up his face like he was angry."
Pinto testified that two days after the child made the statement regarding his mother; she reported it to a Detective, who later interviewed her and the boy in person shortly thereafter. The Detective testified at a hearing to determine whether the statement was admissible and corroborated Pintoīs account that she called him to report the childīs statement, and that he interviewed her in person a few weeks later.
Defendant objected that his sonīs statements were inadmissible hearsay; the trial court overruled defendantīs objection, ruling that Pintoīs statement was corroborated by the Detectiveīs recollection of the incident, and Pintoīs testimony regarding defendantīs sonīs hearsay statement fell "within the parameter of the spontaneous declaration exception of the hearsay rule" and was admissible.
On appeal, defendant argues that the admission of the childīs hearsay statement violated his right to a fair trial, his right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as his right to due process pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Spontaneous Statements
Evidence Code section 1240 states that a statement is not inadmissible hearsay if it "purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived" and was made "spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception."
Spontaneous statements are deemed sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted into evidence because in the stress of nervous excitement the reflective faculties may be stilled and the utterance may become the unreflecting and sincere expression of oneīs actual impressions and belief. (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318).
Case law states that for the exception to apply, there must be (1) an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce "nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting;" (2) the utterance must have been made before there was time to "contrive and misrepresent," i.e., while the nervous excitement still dominated the reflective powers; and (3) "the utterance must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence causing it." (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318).
The admissibility of spontaneous statements is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. (People v. Pearch (1991) 229 Cal.App. 3d 1282, 1290). Often, the main issue is a lapse in time between the event and the statement. The key is that the statement must be made under the stress and excitement of the event "while the reflective powers were still in abeyance." (People v. Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1170, 1176).
In People v. Gutierrez, the defendant argued that the childīs statement did not satisfy the requirements of a spontaneous declaration because the childīs ability to reflect and fabricate had returned by the time he made the statement, and the statement failed to describe the event immediately preceding it. The word "spontaneous" as used in Evidence Code section 1240 means "actions undertaken without deliberation or reflection.
The crucial element in determining whether an out-of-court statement is admissible as a spontaneous statement is the mental state of the speaker. (People v. Farmer, supra, 47 Cal.3d 888, 903.) The nature of the utterance and how long it was made after the startling incident are important as indications of the mental state of the declarant.
Although in People v. Gutierrez there was evidence the boy was upset, because he was crying and "scrunching up his face like he was angry," there is nothing to indicate that during the two-month period following his motherīs murder he had remained under the stress of excitement caused by witnessing the event and that his reflective powers were still in abeyance. On appeal, the court therefore concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the childīs hearsay statement.
As is evident from this article and the recent case of People v. Gutierrez, there is no bright-line rule as to the admissibility of spontaneous statements.
If you plan to introduce a spontaneous utterance at trial or have any questions about hearsay or the admissibility of evidence please contact our team of experienced Orange County criminal defense attorneys at Wallin & Klarich. You can reach us 24 hours a day, 7 days a week at 877-466-5245 or go to our website at www.wklaw.com for more information.
People v. Gutierrez Los Angeles County:
On October 1, 1996, Dawn Nakatani, defendantīs ex-girlfriend and the mother of his child, was beaten, strangled, and left dead in her Baldwin Park home. More than two months after the murder in California, on December 7, 1996, the victimīs sister, Kim Pinto was driving defendantīs son to his maternal grandmotherīs house and mentioned that the next day they were going to visit his motherīs grave at the cemetery. The boy responded that he would "untie my mommy," that he saw his "daddy and his mean friend tie up my mommy," and that he hit his dad to get him to stop, at which point defendant carried him upstairs and placed a Casper video in the video cassette recorder for him to watch.
In People v. Gutierrez, the trial court granted the Peopleīs motion to introduce, over defendantīs objections, the out-of-court statement of defendantīs son implicating defendant in Nakataniīs death. At trial, Pinto testified that while she and defendantīs three-year-old son were driving to her motherīs house on December 7, 1996, approximately two months following the death of Nakatani, Pinto told the child that they were going to the cemetery to visit his motherīs grave. In response, defendantīs son told Pinto, "Iīm going to untie my mommy." Pinto asked the boy "who told him that," and he replied that "his daddy and his mean friend tied up his mommy." The child made a tying motion with his hands and pointed at his neck while making this statement. The boy stated that he hit defendant, told defendant to stop, and defendant carried him upstairs. While making his statement, the child was crying, and "scrunching up his face like he was angry."
Pinto testified that two days after the child made the statement regarding his mother; she reported it to a Detective, who later interviewed her and the boy in person shortly thereafter. The Detective testified at a hearing to determine whether the statement was admissible and corroborated Pintoīs account that she called him to report the childīs statement, and that he interviewed her in person a few weeks later.
Defendant objected that his sonīs statements were inadmissible hearsay; the trial court overruled defendantīs objection, ruling that Pintoīs statement was corroborated by the Detectiveīs recollection of the incident, and Pintoīs testimony regarding defendantīs sonīs hearsay statement fell "within the parameter of the spontaneous declaration exception of the hearsay rule" and was admissible.
On appeal, defendant argues that the admission of the childīs hearsay statement violated his right to a fair trial, his right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as his right to due process pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Spontaneous Statements
Evidence Code section 1240 states that a statement is not inadmissible hearsay if it "purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived" and was made "spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception."
Spontaneous statements are deemed sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted into evidence because in the stress of nervous excitement the reflective faculties may be stilled and the utterance may become the unreflecting and sincere expression of oneīs actual impressions and belief. (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318).
Case law states that for the exception to apply, there must be (1) an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce "nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting;" (2) the utterance must have been made before there was time to "contrive and misrepresent," i.e., while the nervous excitement still dominated the reflective powers; and (3) "the utterance must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence causing it." (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318).
The admissibility of spontaneous statements is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. (People v. Pearch (1991) 229 Cal.App. 3d 1282, 1290). Often, the main issue is a lapse in time between the event and the statement. The key is that the statement must be made under the stress and excitement of the event "while the reflective powers were still in abeyance." (People v. Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1170, 1176).
In People v. Gutierrez, the defendant argued that the childīs statement did not satisfy the requirements of a spontaneous declaration because the childīs ability to reflect and fabricate had returned by the time he made the statement, and the statement failed to describe the event immediately preceding it. The word "spontaneous" as used in Evidence Code section 1240 means "actions undertaken without deliberation or reflection.
The crucial element in determining whether an out-of-court statement is admissible as a spontaneous statement is the mental state of the speaker. (People v. Farmer, supra, 47 Cal.3d 888, 903.) The nature of the utterance and how long it was made after the startling incident are important as indications of the mental state of the declarant.
Although in People v. Gutierrez there was evidence the boy was upset, because he was crying and "scrunching up his face like he was angry," there is nothing to indicate that during the two-month period following his motherīs murder he had remained under the stress of excitement caused by witnessing the event and that his reflective powers were still in abeyance. On appeal, the court therefore concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the childīs hearsay statement.
As is evident from this article and the recent case of People v. Gutierrez, there is no bright-line rule as to the admissibility of spontaneous statements.
If you plan to introduce a spontaneous utterance at trial or have any questions about hearsay or the admissibility of evidence please contact our team of experienced Orange County criminal defense attorneys at Wallin & Klarich. You can reach us 24 hours a day, 7 days a week at 877-466-5245 or go to our website at www.wklaw.com for more information.
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