In Israel, the battle over the conduct of the war in Gaza has just begun

The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) announced at the start of the week that it was closing its short-lived investigation into reports that its soldiers described "permissive rules of engagement" that led to — among other things — Israeli soldiers shooting unarmed civilians (some waving white flags) during Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, and large-scale destruction of civilian property.

The Israeli military operation involved an unprecedented use of force in Gaza. It was described as the harshest Israeli assault on Gaza since the June 1967 Six-Day War. The Palestinian death toll from air strikes on Hamas compounds on the opening day alone was the highest for any single day since the creation of the State of Israel.

The Israeli soldiers´ stories echoed Palestinian accounts of what had happened during the war, as compiled by journalists and also by local and international human rights groups.

A group of Israeli human rights organizations issued a statement saying: "[I]n response to the Israeli Army´s speedy closing of internal investigation files about war crimes in Operation Cast Lead: The speedy closing of the investigation immediately raises suspicions that the very opening of this investigation was merely the army´s attempt to wipe its hands of all blame for illegal activity during Operation Cast Lead. The internal investigation ignored a significant amount of material that was collected and that coincides with soldiers´ testimonies recently publicized in Israel media. In addition, the Military Advocate General disregarded allegations that several of the commands given during the military operations were illegal. It is clear that in this case, the Military Police Criminal Investigations Department (MPCID) has decided to focus on the individual soldier, a measure which is neither effective nor reliable".

This statement was signed by the following groups: B´Tselem, Yesh Din, Physicians for Human Rights, The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Gisha, Hamoked, The Public Committee Against Torture, Adalah, and Bimkom. Most — if not all — of these groups came together about mid-way through Operation Cast Lead, and issued a statement which they defended at a Jerusalem press conference saying that the Israeli military attack on Gaza caused a "clear and present danger" to Palestinian civilians trapped in the Gaza Strip.

The now-closed IDF investigation was, apparently, focused only on remarks by Israeli soldiers in a closed debriefing at the Oranim military academy near Haifa about a month after the end of the IDF´s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. What the soldiers said "shocked us", said Dany Zamir, the director of a program at the military academy who had organized the group discussion.

His concern, Zamir said, led him to submit a transcript of the soldiers´ remarks to the military, then to publish excerpts in a military journal, before it was somehow brought to the attention of Amos Harel, military correspondent of Haaretz, who published the accounts ten days ago.

Two other Israeli media also published reports on the soldiers´ stories, while the Jerusalem Post published articles challenging the soldiers´ stories. There has been a raging debate in Israeli society ever since.

The IDF said the investigation, by Military Police, into this matter was closed. But, it is safe to say, this is not yet over. The IDF itself said that other investigations are continuing.

As AP reported after the military closed its week-long investigation, the IDF "angrily" accused the soldiers of "harming the IDF´s image in Israel´s and in the world".

But, none of the soldiers who participated in the discussion has, apparently, spoken directly to the media.

Other soldiers have been willing to speak to the media – and have told journalists that they did not witness anything like what the soldiers who met in Oranim described – and proclaimed that their consciences were clear.

Zamir is being vilified as "irresponsible", and as a person "with an agenda".

After a thorough investigation, the IDF said in a statement, it was concluded that "the crucial components of their descriptions were based on hearsay and not supported by specific personal knowledge … Additionally, it was found that once the claims were checked, they were not supported by the facts as determined by the investigation. The investigation concluded from the soldiers who participated in the conference that the stories told were purposely exaggerated and made extreme, in order to make a point with the participants of the conference".

Haaretz´s Harel wrote a scathing commentary. "One would be hard-pressed not to express astonishment at the speed and efficiency demonstrated by the Military Advocate General, Brigadier-General Avichai Mendelblit, and the Military Police investigation unit in probing the ´combat soldiers´ testimonials affair´ that took place at the Rabin pre-military training academy … [T]he military advocate general needed just 11 days (including two Saturdays) to probe the accounts of combat soldiers in order to completely dispel the allegations. There is something soothing in the exhaustive investigation by the military advocate general. The IDF emerges from it (and from the Gaza Strip) as pure as snow. Yet at the same time there is a disconcerting message emanating from the closure of the investigation, one which, at least according to Brig. Gen. Mendelblit, a group of combat soldiers and officers serving in some of the finest units in the IDF has proven to be nothing but a bunch of liars and exaggerating storytellers, men who have not uttered one truthful word. The military advocate general picks apart the testimonials brick by brick. Not only does he present alternative versions to the two most damning claims - the alleged shooting of a Palestinian mother and her children as well as the killing of an elderly Palestinian woman - but he also expends great effort in concealing a series of other allegations of improper behavior, from spitting on home photographs of Palestinian families to uprooting orchards to the use of white phosphorus bombs. Apparently, soldiers informed military police investigators of two more incidents in which civilians were mistakenly shot to death. Mendelblit retroactively provides a rationale for the soldiers´ predicament in these cases as well … [However] it is unclear how they can be so certain that the ´combat soldiers´ testimonials´ were just a series of rumors and concoctions ´while the soldiers were truthful during the investigations conducted by the military police and the Givati brigades commander´."

After the IDF announced that the investigation was being closed, selected journalists were briefed by Maj. Yehoshua Gutler, legal assistant to the military´s advocate general, who said, according to a report by AP, that in one case reported by the soldiers in the post-war discussion, "the elderly woman was wearing bulky clothing and the soldiers had reason to believe she was a threat after intelligence reports showed ´Hamas was going to use an elderly woman as a suicide bomber as they had in the past´."

The AP account of Maj. Yehoshua Gutler´s explanations went on: "The woman continued to advance despite repeated calls to stop and warning shots fired in the air, and soldiers had ´no choice´ but to shoot"…

Even if — if — that was the case, does that mean that each and every "elderly woman" — such as the one who was killed in this incident — is a legitimate military target? Apparently, when it comes to Hamas, the answer for many Israeli soldiers could be, yes.

In this case, the soldiers did not even bother to check.

The Washington Post later reported that "Maj. Yehoshua Gurtler, a military lawyer, told reporters that investigators had matched the allegations with actual incidents -- including one in which an elderly woman was shot. In that case and others, he said, soldiers had followed the rules of engagement set out for the Gaza operation and had acted in accordance with Israeli law. The elderly woman, suspected of being a suicide bomber, continued approaching an IDF position after soldiers yelled at her to stop and fired warning shots, Gurtler said. Once she was 'within several yards', he said, the soldiers killed her. Gurtler said the body was not inspected to see if the woman carried arms or explosives, and was removed by Palestinian authorities. 'The soldiers in accordance with IDF doctrine did not approach the body for fear that an explosive device might be detonated', Gurtler said. 'We don't know whether or not she was a suicide bomber, but the fact that she continued approaching -- this was a clear suspicion'." The Washington Post story is posted here.

Israeli lawyer and human rights defender Michael Sfard said in an interview in his Tel Aviv office on Monday that "The testimonies by the Israeli soldiers that were revealed in Haaretz are shocking but in no way surprising. The testimonies from Palestinians and foreigners that were in Gaza during the Israeli assault have all led Israeli human rights organizations to the conclusion that something is really wrong with IDF rules of engagement. The soldiers´ testimonies have only confirmed what we have suspected before, and that is that Israeli rules of engagement as given to the soldiers on the ground were extremely permissive and not discriminatory as international humanitarian law requires. The fact of the matter is that Israeli ground soldiers have attacked civilian installations with fierce force, and that is something that must have created the understanding among the soldiers that it [they] can, unfortunately, wound and kill civilians, unarmed civilians. What we´ve seen with the recent testimonies given was that not only the IDF soldiers were given the permit to shoot at civilian infrastructure and civilian installations and buildings, from where assault or fire was fired at them, [but] also that certain zones were defined as actually death zones, areas where if anyone is walking through should be attacked. And that is in direct contradiction to what international humanitarian law and laws of war demand".

Sfard added that "I understand from the Haaretz report that these soldiers were ground troops operating in Gaza during the ground assault, and they were low-ranking soldiers, and there was one commander, even, among those soldiers. But they were the simple soldiers on the ground, getting orders and obeying these orders, without thinking too much. For me, as a lawyer, the fact that these testimonies were given by simple soldiers, low-ranking soldiers, makes it extremely … um… I think they have no reason to lie, and their testimonies were given against their own interests, and I think we should look at these testimonies, look into them … I think these testimonies, because they were given by simple soldiers, not by high-ranking officers, are trust-worthy. The soldiers have nothing to gain from giving those testimonies. And, they corroborate testimonies given by the victims, by Palestinians in Gaza. And testimonies by Palestinians we have hundreds of them — human Rights organizations were gathering those testimonies during the assault and immediately after. And these testimonies of the soldiers just fit into the puzzle. And so the suspicion we had in the first place now becomes really heavy".

In an interview in Jerusalem on Monday afternoon, Yehuda Shaul, the head and one of the founders of the Israeli group "Breaking the Silence" which collects and publishes verified testimony from soldiers and former soldiers about abusive and illegal behavior in the occupied Palestinian territories, expressed shock that IDF bulldozers demolished Palestinian homes in the third week of the Israeli military operation Gaza, when it was clear that there was no imminent threat or danger.

Shaul said that during Operation Cast Lead, "we in Breaking the Silence had a feeling that this time, it´s something different. It´s something else than what we´re used to. And we decided that we´re going to do research on this operation. And right after the operation ended we started contacting people and tried to reach soldiers who served there as conscripts or as reservists. And until today we´ve interviewed 16 people. And I can say very much the stuff that we hear from soldiers who served in Gaza are very much in line with the accounts that were published a week ago in the Israeli media, in Haaretz and Maariv … and what the soldiers said in the Rabin Pre-Military Academy Institute in Tivon. And, it´s something very, very different than what we used to hear before".

Shaul continued: "Look, I served three years, during the height of the Second Intifada, in big operations, such as Defensive Shield operation and other operations. In the past five years, all I deal with is other soldiers´ testimonies. And I haven´t heard, until today, anything close to what I hear coming out from Gaza, about the attitude of commanders, the atmosphere in the military, the concept of going in to an operation without basically receiving rules of engagement, because the idea is, the concept is, you´re entering into a war zone, everything that moves you shoot, and everything that doesn´t move you also can shoot. I think that one of the most disturbing things coming out of this operation, and that is something that you can read in the accounts of the soldiers from Tivon that were published, and we hear a lot from our guys, which if the way we used to, that everytime you operate in urban areas and the briefings commanders will raise up the issue in front of the soldiers, you know, be careful not to hurt anyone, innocent people, and innocent property, and this kind of stuff. This time it was, the notion was, totally different. Being careful not to hurt civilians wasn´t even said. I´m not saying all units, all the time, all over, but at least 5-6 different battalions that we´ve heard from, commanders in the briefings before the operation didn´t even mention the possibility of bumping into innocent civilians in the area. We´re talking about mass destruction of property, not for immediate, necessary operational needs. You have to understand the way the IDF worked in this operation is that the conscripts led the attack, and after they captured an area, reservists came behind, took over the place, and the conscripts, you know, took the step forward. And, you know, I´m talking about neighborhoods that were captured in the first week of the operation, second week already, reservists hauled/pulled in, and only in the third week, towards the end, the D-9 bulldozers enter and start to demolish property, you know, the houses and buildings around. So, you know, two weeks, no combat, no attacks there in that area – and that´s when demolition started. These are very, very much things we haven´t heard before".

The Jerusalem Post's military correspondent Yaakov Katz, who has excellent sources in the Defense Ministry, wrote in an article published Monday that the IDF has an "unmanned version of the D9 bulldozer - called 'Black Thunder' - [which] was developed several years ago by the Engineering Corps and ... only recently declassified".

Katz wrote in the Jerusalem Post that this new "unmanned bulldozer" worked so well during the IDF's Operation Cast Lead -- the ground offensive started on 3 January, and continued until the cease-fire on 18 January -- that "The IDF Ground Forces Command plans to double the number of unmanned D9 armored bulldozers in the Engineering Corps arsenal after the vehicle provided exceptional results during Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip in January ... 'The unmanned D9 performed remarkably during Operation Cast Lead, clearing roads of mines and explosive devices', explained one officer in the Ground Forces Command … The Black Thunder looks like a regular D9 bulldozer but is equipped with a number of cameras that transmit images to the operator, who controls the vehicle with a wireless remote control. The unmanned D9 participated widely in Operation Cast Lead as well as in the Second Lebanon War in 2006. 'The unmanned version is important since if there is a concern that an area is loaded with mines it can save lives', the officer said, adding that in the event of a communications malfunction the vehicle can be turned into a manned vehicle and operated like a regular D9. The Engineering Corps receive[d] praise within the IDF for its participation in the operation in Gaza in January, with soldiers specializing in bomb disposal and detection leading regular infantry and armored forces on searches of Palestinian homes"... Yaakov Katz's article in the JPost can be read in full here.

If this report is true, that means that large, very large, machines were apparently lumbering around the densely-populated Gaza strip during Operation Cast Lead -- while being operated by remote control.

D-9 bulldozers are manufactured by Caterpillar, and armored by state-owned Israel Military Industries. They are four meters high, and nearly 8 meters long. With an operating weight of 49 tons -- reportedly more than 60 with IDF armour -- they were previously used by the IDF in Rafah, and in Jenin in 2002. Actually, according to the Israeli business publication Globes, "The IDF Engineering Corps have used the D9 bulldozer for combat missions since the 1948 War of Independence".

Asked about the Katz report in the Jerusalem Post, Yehuda Shaul of Breaking the Silence said "I, I didn´t see that… I didn´t know about that…No, I´m talking about, I spoke to a D-9 driver…He [Yaakov Katz] talked about D-9s that don´t have [drivers]? It sounds very weird…A: I know that there is small stuff that has remote control, but not a big D-9… I´ll have to check

Q: How big is it?

A: Huge! … I think it´s about 4 or 5 meters high, something like that.

Another Israeli military correspondent, asked about the Katz report on the use of unmanned D-9s in the Gaza operation, said "I don´t read the Jerusalem Post, and I don´t know anything about this".

A week ago, Harel wrote in Haaretz that "GOC Southern Command Yoav Galant's meticulous planning for Operation Cast Lead was mapped out to the last detail ... [But] ... The General Staff expected that Israelis would have trouble accepting heavy Israel Defense Forces losses. The army chose to overcome this problem with an aggressive plan that included overwhelming firepower. The forces, it was decided, would advance into the urban areas behind a 'rolling curtain' of aerial and artillery fire, backed up by intelligence from unmanned aircraft and the Shin Bet. The lives of our soldiers take precedence, the commanders were told in briefings. Before the operation, Galant and Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi painted a bleak picture for the cabinet ministers. 'Unlike in Lebanon, the civilians in Gaza won't have many places to escape to', Ashkenazi warned. 'When an armored force enters the city, shells will fly, because we'll have to protect our people'. The politicians promised backing. Two weeks before the incursion, a member of the General Staff, talking to a journalist, predicted that 600-800 Palestinians civilians would be killed in an Israeli operation ... Presumably, the IDF operated with more restraint than most armies, but the question is whether Israel uses this as a pretext to justify its actions. A large part of the operation was conducted by remote control … There is a discrepancy between the official military response, of denial and horrified disapproval, the testimonies of the Rabin pre-military preparatory course graduates, and the response to those reports by key officers, unwilling to be identified. 'What did you think would happen?' a senior officer wondered this week. 'We sent 10,000 troops into Gaza, more than 200 tanks and armored personnel carriers, 100 bulldozers. What were 100 bulldozers going to do there?´ "

Harel pointed out that the IDF chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Ashkenazi, who recently said "I do not believe this happened",) "is also the commander of the investigators in the IDF criminal investigation division" … This Amos Harel report is posted on the Haaretz website here.

Today, at a briefing for journalists by a media services organization that offers the Israeli point of view, three soldiers who had served in Gaza all said that their consciences were clear. "War is ugly, but we did whatever we could to keep our ethics and limit civilian casualties", said I., a commander in a special unit under the IDF´s Givati Brigade, which worked to get "real-time intelligence" during the fighting. "We knew exactly what was going on, and I can´t tell you more", he said. I. identified himself as a senor information systems manger with Intel, and said he is a reserve officer who was on active duty during Operation Cast Lead. His unit fought beside Givati as they moved into the Zeitoun district of Gaza City. He said he never saw a Hamas fighter in uniform – which he indicated was a violation of law of war -- and he said "they hid their weapons when they moved in the streets". He said that he never saw before the use of so many expensive "guided missiles", aimed to hit only the correct and designated target. He indicated that he had been promoted to the rank of Major as a result of his performance the Gaza war.

He said he was sure there were cases where soldiers made the wrong decisions – given the difficult conditions, it would be almost impossible not to have some mistakes. But, he said, "I was inside the Gaza Strip for two weeks, as part of a mobilizing team, and I haven´t seen it". The rules for firing were no different at all from the Second Lebanon War, he said: "If you identify the enemy, you shoot – and that means kill". The problem was to distinguish between Hamas (activists or fighters, he said) and civilians – and this was difficult, he said, because "Hamas used Iranian and Syrian doctrine and drew their defense lines by civilian districts – they planned it that way". The other major difference in this operation, according to I., is that the soldiers were instructed to make sure not to let anyone get kidnapped: "For Hamas, they can have half the Gaza population dead, and one Israeli soldier kidnapped, and they won" he said. Tunnels were a big threat, he said, and Hamas jumped out of them many times. He also said there were lots of booby traps planted in the Zeitoun district. He explained that is why, even after IDF troops had been sitting in an area for days, Hamas remained a constant threat – "because they use tunnels and human shields", he said. "That´s why all the time you are there, you are under threat".

On the D-9s, he, too, was evasive when asked about the reported use of unmanned D-9s in the Gaza war, but did say: "Yes, we used d-9s. I was there. I was beside the commander. There was no order given to destroy property just for fun, just to punish the Palestinians. Every operation with a D-9 has to go through some level of approval process. It would be used, for example, if a house was a threat because it is part of Hamas´ defense. This is a decision-making that the commander needs to do, and you need to have a very good reason to use a D-9".

In mid-December, before the Hanukkah holiday, and before Operation Cast Lead (named after a type of dreidel, a Hannuka toy) was launched with air and naval strikes on 27 December, Harel wrote in Haaretz that the Defense Ministry legal adviser advised Minister Ehud Barak that "Israel should not use artillery fire to target rocket-launching militants in the Gaza Strip if the fire is aimed at populated areas" … 'Artillery fire is permissible only in relatively open areas', Ahaz Benari wrote in the legal opinion. 'Artillery fire at urban areas is problematic, if the assessment is that the chance that the shell will hit the launchers is relatively low, while the risk that many civilians will be hurt is substantial' … Benari's opinion appears to be backed by leading military prosecution officials, though Attorney General Menachem Mazuz has yet to express a firm opinion on the matter. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has promised to hold a cabinet meeting on the issue shortly. Benari wrote the legal opinion December 7, after cabinet ministers called for a reexamination of the steps Israel is using to counter Qassam fire. The opinion reviews international law on the matter and finds that while there is no wholesale ban on artillery fire at sites from which rockets were launched, the fire should be aimed at military targets and be able to distinguish between the target and civilians or civilian property. The opinion also states that if damage to civilians or their property is expected as a result of the artillery fire, the IDF must make sure the damage is not much greater than the expected military benefit - an expression of the legal principle known as proportionality … The IDF developed a detailed procedure for artillery fire in Gaza in 2006, which approves shooting only in open areas and mandates that a distance be kept from buildings. But the IDF halted its use of artillery fire altogether after accidentally killing 18 Palestinian civilians in the Gaza town of Beit Hanun in November 2006, even though the artillery fire was meant to target open areas. The legal opinion also addressed the creation of ghost towns in Gaza, involving the eviction of Gazans from their homes in areas Palestinian militants use for launching rockets, as an Israeli response to the rocket fire. Benari said international law allows Israel to warn the residents of the intended IDF artillery response and evacuate a particular area for a short time. But even then, he said, the IDF cannot engage in carpet bombing, which would lead to the intended massive destruction of property that does not constitute a legitimate target. He said Israel must also take into account that some civilians will remain in the area even if they are advised to leave..." This account -- with the pre-war legal advice -- is posted here here.